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Peretz v. United States: Magistrates Perform Felony Voir Dire
In the twenty-four years since Congress passed the Federal Magistrates Act,1 courts and commentators have debated the scope of magistrates' duties.2 Responding to judicial interpretation of the "additional
duties" clause of the Act3 and the increasing caseload of the federal
courts, Congress twice amended the Act.4 Through these changes Con1. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (current version at
28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1988)). Congress passed the Magistrates Act to assist district judges in
their judicial duties and to offset increasing caseloads in the federal courts. See Christopher E.
Smith, Who Are the U.S. Magistrates?,71 JUDICATURE 143, 143 (1987). Subject to specified
controls, magistrates may perform almost all tasks of a district judge "except trying and sentencing felony defendants." Id One of the chief benefits the system derives from magistrates
is the "prompt disposition of cases in the court." H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172.
2. See, eg., McCarthy v. Bronson, 111 S. Ct. 1737, 1739 (1991); Gomez v. United States,
490 U.S. 858, 860-62 (1989), rev'g United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1328 (2d Cir. 1988);
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 669 (1980); United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493,
501 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223,
227 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991); United States v.
Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1437 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1034 (1988); Jack
B. Streepy, The DevelopingRole of the Magistratein the FederalCourts, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
81, 92 (1980); Raymond B. Bolanos, Note, Magistrates and Felony Voir Dire: A Threat to
FundamentalFairness?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 827, 844-53 (1989); Reinier H. Kraakman, Note,
Article III Constraintsand the ExpandingCivil Jurisdictionof FederalMagistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1058-61 (1979); Thomas J. Platt, Comment, The Expanding
Influence of the FederalMagistrate, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 465, 488-89 (1981).
3. The "additional duties" clause provides that "[a] magistrate may be assigned such
additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1988). In Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), the Supreme Court
ruled that the Magistrates Act's additional-duties clause does not permit magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings on federal habeas corpus petitions. Id. at 472. Federal appellate
court decisions also had interpreted this clause narrowly. Bolanos, supra note 2, at 841 (citing
Ellis v. Buckhoe, 491 F.2d 716, 717 (6th Cir. 1974); Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268,
1271 (6th Cir. 1972); Rainha v. Cassidy, 454 F.2d 207, 208 (1st Cir. 1972)).
4. In 1976, Congress completely revised the additional-duties clause. Act of Oct. 21,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1988));
see H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162,
6169. The amendments delineated the pretrial matters that were delegable to magistrates. 90
Stat. at 2729; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). These additions also included specific provisions for
de novo review of the magistrate's findings. 90 Stat. at 2729; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Despite its clarification of a magistrate's role, Congress retained the nebulous provision that
"[a] magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 90 Stat. at 2729; see § 636(b)(3). Further expanding
magistrates' roles, Congress amended the Act in 1979 to allow, with the parties' consent, entry
of judgment in a civil matter. Act of Oct. 10, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643, 643-44
(1979) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988)). At the same time, Congress, expanding criminal jurisdiction of the Act, granted magistrates the right to try and sentence
defendants in federal misdemeanor trials. 93 Stat. at 645-46; see 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1988).
The 1979 amendments also set more stringent standards for magistrate selection. 93 Stat. at
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gress expanded magistrates' powers to include "conduct[ing] any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order[ing] the entry of
judgment" if the parties consent.' Magistrates also may preside over jury
selection in criminal misdemeanor trials, but only if the defendant consents in writing.' Defending its broad interpretations of the "additional
duties" clause since these amendments, the Supreme Court has noted
that its decisions comport with congressional intent and axe consistent
with the structural provisions7 of Article III of the United States Constitution.' Yet, the Court only recently faced directly the question whether
the "additional duties" clause9 of the Federal Magistrates Act encompassed jury selection by a magistrate in a felony trial if the defendant
consented.
In Peretz v. United States10 a bare majority 1 of the Justices decided
that the "additional duties" clause of the Act permits federal magistrates
to conduct voir dire 2 in felony trials.' 3 The majority concluded that the
defendant's constitutional right to an Article III judge' 4 at jury selection
was a personal right subject to waiver.' Moreover, it concluded that,
although aspects of structural rights were present, these rights were not
implicated sufficiently to threaten the structural protections built into
Article III.16 According to the Peretz Court, the defendant's waiver, to644-45; see 28 U.S.C. § 631; see also Bolanos, supra note 2, at 841-44 (discussing the amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a).
7. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1980).
8. Article III of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3); see supra note 3.
10. 111 S.Ct. 2661 (1991).
11. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Id. at 2663.
12. Voir dire is "the preliminary examination which the court and attorneys make of
prospective jurors to determine their qualification and suitability to serve as jurors." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2671.
14. Article III judges possess the protections afforded by Article III of the Constitutionlife tenure and guaranteed salary. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 1; see Ralph U. Whitten, Consent,
Caseload,and OtherJustificationsfor Non-Article III Courts andJudges: A Comment on Commodities [sic] Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 20 CREIGI-rrON L. R-v. 11, 12 (1986).
15. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2669.
16. Id. The structural protections of Article III "safeguard[] the role of the Judicial
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gether with the absence of noteworthy structural threats, permitted the
magistrate to proceed with voir dire.17 This holding, in the face of previous Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Magistrates Act, represents
a significant expansion of Court-sanctioned magisterial powers.18
This Note examines Peretz by reviewing the evolution of the Federal
Branch in our tripartite system." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 850 (1986). Such structural protections are not subject to waiver because they "serve
institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect." Id. at 851. Although the
Article III provision for an impartial adjudicator, or a judge with life tenure and undiminishable salary, constitutes a personal right subject to waiver, it implicates structural concerns as
well. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2669; see also Schor, 478 U.S. at 849-50 (holding that Article III,
§ 1,although mainly construed to protect personal rights, also safeguards the overall system of
checks and balances).
Two exceptions to Article III permit Congress to create "tribunals" whose officials lack
the tenure and salary protections of their Article III counterparts. Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-68, 80-83 (1982). These exceptions developed
from the concept that Article III power did not form the basis for legislative courts' jurisdiction; rather, Congress, in the exercise of its general powers, confers jurisdiction. Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553, 565 (1933); see also American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
511, 545-46 (1828) (explaining the development of legislative courts); J.Anthony Downs, The
Boundaries ofArticle Il" Delegation of FinalDecisionmakingAuthority to Magistrates,52 U.
C-I. L. REv. 1032, 1038-42 (1985) (describing exceptions to Article III courts). The two
exceptions are legislative courts and Article III adjuncts.
Legislative courts are: (1) courts for United States territories; (2) military courts; and
(3) "public rights" courts. Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 64-67. The "public rights" doctrine
applies only to matters "arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority
in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments."' Id at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). Thus,
"public rights" courts decide matters usually within the executive or legislative prerogative.
Id. at 68. This doctrine developed from the principles of sovereign immunity and separation of
powers. Because these matters could have been determined exclusively by legislative or executive departments, Congress' decision to allow a legislative court or administrative agency to
determine these matters vitiates any constitutional objections. Id at 68-69.
An Article III adjunct's power "derives from the [A]rticle III court, in which jurisdiction
and control remain vested." Downs, supra, at 1042. The adjunct assists the federal district
judges in a variety of ways. For example, "assessors" compute damages and "masters" conduct factfinding. Eric M. Wagner, Magistrate Trials: The New Hierarchyof Class 2 Adjuncts
and Article III Judges, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 559, 566 n.23 (1984). Agencies created to
adjudicate congressionally created federal rights, such as the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, are also adjuncts. Id. at 566 n.27. Adjuncts are divided into two categories. While Class One adjuncts aid in adjudicating specific rights created by Congress, Class
Two adjuncts assist the court in general matters permeating all substantive law. Id. at 566-67.
Magistrates resemble adjuncts because magistrates "assist in the adjudication of constitutional
rights." Id. at 567.
17. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2671.
18. Id (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Voicing objections to the waiver of Article III protections in a strong dissent, Justice Marshall opined that a defendant could not waive his right to
voir dire conducted by an Article III judge merely by consenting. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justices White and Blackmun joined Justice Marshall's dissent; Justice Scalia dissented
separately. See id. at 2677-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Magistrates Act and the prior cases that construed it.' 9 The Note analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in Peretz, focusing on the various policy considerations that support and discourage magistrateconducted felony voir dire.20 Although the Court interpreted its most
important holding prior to Peretz, Gomez v. United States,2 ' as basing a
magistrate's disqualification to conduct voir dire on the lack of defendant's consent, 22 the Peretz Court ignored a substantial portion of its previous opinion in Gomez and instead relied on circuit court opinions.2 3
The majority also casually dismissed the major constitutional issue of
whether magistrate-conducted felony voir dire violates the structural
protections of Article III by overemphasizing the personal rights aspect
of the Article.24

The government charged Peretz and a codefendant with importing
four kilograms of heroin. 25 During the pretrial conference, at which
counsel represented Peretz, the district judge received consent from Peretz's lawyer to select the jury before a federal magistrate. 26 The magistrate again asked Peretz's lawyer if he had his client's consent before
proceeding with jury selection. 27 At trial, the defendants neither asked
the judge to review any of the magistrate's rulings nor raised objections
to the conduct of the voir dire. 28 The jury convicted Peretz, but acquitted his codefendant.2 9
On appeal, Peretz contended that assignment ofjury selection to the
magistrate constituted reversible error.3 0 The United States Court of Ap19. See infra notes 81-147 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 170-234 and accompanying text.
21. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
22. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2667.
23. The difficulty inhering in reliance on lower courts is the Court's virtual readiness to
ignore direct precedent from a case decided by the Court only two years before, and to evade
analysis of the Gomez opinion itself. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
25. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2663.
26. Id. When the judge asked whether jury selection before the magistrate was acceptable, Peretz's counsel replied, "'I would love the opportunity."' Id
27. Id
28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id. Peretz maintained that the Court's holding in United States v. Gomez, 490 U.S.
858 (1989), required reversal of his conviction. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2663. In Gomez defendants Gomez and Chavez-Tesina, indicted for multiple felonies involving cocaine distribution,
were convicted after a jury trial in which the magistrate selected the jury. Gomez, 490 U.S. at
860-61. Defense counsel had objected to delegation of jury selection to the magistrate both
before jury selection commenced and when he appeared before the district judge. Id. at 860.
The court of appeals had held that the delegation violated neither the Federal Magistrates Act
nor Article III of the Constitution. United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1330-33 (2d Cir.
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peals for the Second Circuit disagreed. 3 1 Relying on United States v.
Musacchia,3 2 an earlier Second Circuit decision interpreting Gomez, the
court affirmed the conviction, holding that explicit consent to magistrateconducted voir dire constituted waiver of the defendant's right to have an
Article III judge conduct jury .selection.33
Resolving a conflict among the circuits, 34 the Supreme Court upheld
the Second Circuit court's decision, reasoning that the "additional duties" clause of the Magistrates Act permits magistrates to conduct voir
dire if the defendant consents." This result, the majority concluded, was
consistent with Article III's guarantee of a life-tenured, salaried judge. 36
The Peretz Court first inspected its earlier holding in Gomez, noting that
the issue there had been narrow: 37 "'whether presiding at the selection
of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent'" is among the
1988), rev'd sub nom. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989). A unanimous Supreme
Court concluded, however, that such delegation was impermissible. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 876;
see infra note 130.
31. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2663.
32. 900 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991). In Musacchia the
defendants had been convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by willfully failing to
pay gasoline excise taxes. Id at 495. They had neither consented nor objected to magistrateconducted voir dire, and failed to raise the issue until after the verdict had been entered. Id. at
501. The Second Circuit, withholding decision until after the Supreme Court decided Gomez,
construed Gomez as failing to create a jurisdictional bar to magistrate-conducted voir dire. Id.
at 503. Thus, the Musacchiacourt concluded that objections to delegating jury selection to a
magistrate could be waived in the same way as the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
The Second Circuit also noted the conflict among circuits in interpreting Gomez. Id. at 502.
The dissent, however, read Gomez as applicable to all cases in which no express consent had
been given. Id at 504 (Lasker, J., dissenting).
33. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669.
34. Before and after Gomez, the courts of appeals arrived at differing conclusions regarding delegation of jury selection to magistrates. On the one hand, three circuit courts favored
magistrate-conducted voir dire. In United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1034 (1988), the Fifth Circuit held that magistrate-conducted voir
dire constituted harmless error when the defendant had failed to object. Id. at 1438-39. Later,
the Third Circuit, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir.
1989), decided that, absent objection by the defendant, delegating voir dire to a magistrate
presented no constitutional difficulties. Id. at 310. Similarly, the First Circuit held that an
objection to magistrate-conducted voir dire must be raised or it is waived; otherwise, permitting a magistrate to preside over jury selection is not plain error. United States v. Lopez-Pena,
912 F.2d 1542, 1545-48 (1st Cir. 1989). On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Act differently in United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991). The Francecourt concluded that, by failing to object to
magistrate-conducted voir dire, the defendant did not waive her right to appellate review. Id.
at 226. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the circuit courts.
Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 781 (1991).
35. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2668.
36. Id. at 2669.
37. Id. at 2664-65.
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additional duties federal judges may assign to magistrates. 38 Recogniz39
ing the importance of the magistrate's role in the federal court system,
the Court outlined the considerations underlying the Gomez decision:
the interpretation of statutes to avoid constitutional issues,' the lack of
an express de novo review provision, and the absence of legislative history mentioning magistrate conduct of voir dire without the defendant's
consent.4 1
The Court distinguished Gomez from Peretz on the basis of con-

sent.42 The majority reasoned that because the defendant's consent removed constitutional concerns about its breadth, the Federal Magistrates
Act merited a broad construction.43 The Peretz Court placed scant emphasis on Congress' failure to enumerate voir dire as a magisterial duty
because magistrate-conducted voir dire would be a conditional power,

contingent upon consent, rather than a general authorization depriving
every defendant of choice.'

The "additional duties" clause, the Court

held, invited innovation in improving the judicial process.4' Consent, the
majority concluded, also moves felony voir dire supervision into the

realm of comparable enumerated duties that a magistrate may assume
with consent under the Act. 46
The Peretz Court relied on lower federal court decisions to analyze

the Magistrates Act.47 After citing several circuit court decisions that

had refused to apply Gomez when the defendant consented,4 8 the Court
adopted the balancing test articulated by the United States Court of Ap38. Id. at 2664 (quoting United States v. Gomez, 490 U.S. 858, 860 (1989) (emphasis
added by Peretz Court)).
39. Id.at 2665.
40. Id. The Court construed the right to an Article III judge as a personal and waivable-rather than a structural and nonwaivable-protection. Id. at 2665-66 n.6.
41. Id. at 2666. Moreover, the duties that could be performed without the defendant's
consent were minor, and not comparable to voir dire in a felony trial. Id.
42. Id at 2667.
43. Id.
44. Id
45. Id. at 2667-68. In the course of its analysis, the Court ignored a large part of the
Gomez opinion. Addressing the legislative history recited in Gomez, the Peretz Court glossed
over the bulk of the history and instead pointed to one letter mentioned briefly. Id. at 2668
n. 11. For a further discussion of Gomez, see infra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
46. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2668. These "consensual duties" include conducting proceedings
in a jury or nonjury civil matter and rendering judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988), and
trying criminal misdemeanor cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1988).
47. See Peretz, Ill S. Ct. at 2667-68.
48. Id. at 2668 (citing United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 3283 (1990)).
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49
peals for Third Circuit in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams:
reading the "additional duties" clause broadly achieves a balance between the policy behind the Federal Magistrates Act and the criminal
defendant's interests in retaining the right to withhold consent to magistrate-conducted jury selection. 0 After analyzing the Federal Magistrates
Act, the Court concluded that magistrate-conducted felony voir dire constituted an additional duty under the Act only if the defendant consented."1 If the defendant sensed injury, the Court reasoned, the burden
52
was on him to object

Turning to a constitutional analysis, the majority held that although
a defendant in a criminal trial may have a right to have an Article III
judge conduct voir dire, this right ceases to exist if the defendant "has
raised no objection to the judge's absence." 3 The Court analogized the
defendant's right to the presence of an Article III judge to other "basic
rights of criminal defendants... subject to waiver": the right to public
trial, the right to be present at all stages of the proceeding, and the right
to be free from unlawful search and seizure.5 4 Because a structural protection under Article III cannot be waived, 5 the Court next addressed
whether delegating voir dire to magistrates impermissibly affects Article
III's structural protections.5 6 Relying on United States v. Raddatz,17 in
49. 892 F.2d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1989).
50. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2668. The Court believed that this reading struck the balance
intended by Congress and assisted in experimentation to enlarge magistrates' roles and improve the judicial process. Id.; see, eg., H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172. Congress explained that the "additional duties"
clause included such functions as reviewing default judgments, accepting jury verdicts, and
completing administrative tasks so that Article III judges can perform "vital and traditional
adjudicatory functions." Id.
51. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2667; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1988).
52. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2668-69. The Court thus equated silence with an affirmative
grant of consent. Id
53. Id at 2669.
54. Id The Court did not distinguish between waiver of nonconstitutional rights, which
are basic to the criminal justice system, and waiver of constitutional rights. See id. Noting
that constitutional rights are subject to waiver, the Court stressed that constitutional rights in
civil and criminal cases may be forfeited by failure to assert the right. Id.
55. See supra note 16. Under Article III, § 2, subject matter jurisdiction is also a structural protection that cannot be waived because of the institutional interests served. Peretz, 111
S. Ct. at 2676 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The structural protections of an independent judiciary, however, do not require the judge to play every role in a trial; Article III is satisfied so
long as the judge "renders the final judgment" in a given case. Note, FederalMagistratesand
the PrinciplesofArticle III, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1947, 1949 (1984). The process of "rendering
the final judgment" is not so easily satisfied. Article III requires that "the entire process
take[s] place under the district court's total control and jurisdiction." United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980). This "process" must also include "the availability of meaningful judicial review." Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2677 (Marshall, 3., dissenting).
56. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2669.
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which the central issue was a suppression hearing for which the Act provided de novo review,"8 the Supreme Court concluded that because the
district court retained total control over the delegation process, no danger of transferring Article III jurisdiction to a non-Article III tribunal
existed.5 9 Accordingly, the Peretz Court concluded that the de novo review provision in the Federal Magistrates Act is applicable only when a
party objects to the magistrate's findings," although the statute itself
fails to provide for de novo review by a judge of magistrate-conducted
voir dire.6 1 Because nothing in the Act precludes judicial review of magistrate-conducted findings in jury selection if a defendant objects, the absence of an enumerated provision was not problematic. 2 Even though
the Court recognized that judicial review of a magistrate's decisions
about jury selection would be difficult due to juror credibility issues and
biases, which would be hard to detect later, the majority reasoned that
other proceedings employing de novo review were subject to similar
problems.6
In a sharp dissenting opinion," Justice Marshall attacked the majority's reasoning on statutory and constitutional grounds. Arguing that
"the absence or presence of consent" was completely "irrelevant to the
Federal Magistrates Act's prohibition upon magistrate jury selection in a
felony trial,"' 65 Marshall contended that the matter simply involved conventional statutory interpretation of the "additional duties" clause. 6 He
emphasized that a unanimous Court in Gomez had found, based on the
absence of a specific reference to jury selection in the statute itself or in
its legislative history, that the "additional duties" clause did not encom6
Justice Marshall reasoned that two grounds suppass jury selectionY.
ported the Gomez Court's holding that judges should retain power over
jury selection. First, because it specifically defined magistrates' authority
to preside over misdemeanor and civil trials, Congress implicitly ex57. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). The Court in Raddatz upheld the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), which allowed a magistrate to conduct evidentiary hearings and provided for
de novo review by an Article III judge. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 684.
58. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 672-74.
59. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2669-70.
60. Id at 2670.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2671.
63. Id. The Court pointed out that magistrates' rulings in suppression hearings often
hinge upon the credibility of witnesses. Id
64. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices White and Blackmun joined Justice Marshall's
opinion. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Id at 2672 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Id at 2672-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cluded felony voir dire from the realm of magisterial duties.6" Second,
the absence of an express provision for judicial review of magistrate jury

selection in felony cases implied Congress's intention that this function
remain nondelegable.6 9 Justice Marshall worried that the majority's reli-

ance on Congress's failure to preclude review did not answer the question
satisfactorily. This conclusion not only failed to designate a process for
judicial review, but also failed to address the unfeasibility of meaningful
review of jury selection.70
Justice Marshall also voiced constitutional objections, 71 rebuking

the majority for dismissing a major constitutional problem merely by invoking the defendant's consent.7'

Noting the Raddatz Court's conclu-

sion that "delegation of Article III powers to a magistrate is permissible
only if the ultimate determinations on the merits of delegated matters are
made by the district judge,"'73 Justice Marshall emphasized the lack of a
provision for judicial review of jury selection in the Federal Magistrates
Act.7 4 As Justice Marshall stressed, the Gomez Court concluded that the
possibility of meaningful judicial review of magistrate-conducted jury selection was highly questionable. 75 Thus, according to Justice Marshall,
the majority allowed waiver of an "unwaivable" structural protection.76
68. Id at 2672 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall also noted the Court's recognition ofjury selection as an essential component of a trial. Id. He noted that the effects of jury
selection pervade the entire trial process. Id at 2672-73 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id at 2673-74 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The Gomez Court had expressed doubts that
any meaningful judicial review of a magistrate's jury selection was possible, because a transcript could not recapture the essence of voir dire. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 87475 (1989). Although the Court in Raddatz solved a similar problem of witness credibility by
stressing that the judge simply could rehear the witness, United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 680-81 (1980), jurors, alerted to the existence of a problem, might become defensive or
mask their prejudices in a second questioning. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875 n.29.
71. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2675 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
72. Iad at 2671-72 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
73. Id at 2677 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683).
74. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting). Hence, the Act did not guarantee an Article III judge
the final decision.
75. For a discussion of problems surrounding judicial review ofjury selection, see supra
note 70.
76. Peretz, 111 . Ct. at 2674 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent also questioned
whether Raddatz and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986),
remain good law. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2677 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In Raddatz the Court
held that the district judge could delegate Article III powers to a magistrate only if the judge
made the ultimate determinations of these matters. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683. Although the
majority contended that magistrate-conducted voir dire met the Raddatz standard because the
district court exercised total control and jurisdiction over the process, Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at
2669-70, Raddatz required the opportunity for meaningful judicial review-which was only
debatably feasible with magistrate-conducted felony voir dire. Id.at 2677 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, upholding an Article I tribunal's performance of traditional Article III
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Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Marshall's interpretation of the
Act: Congress's specification of authority to conduct magisterial duties
in civil and misdemeanor trials and inclusion of explicit consent provi-

sions suggested that Congress intentionally excluded from the Act magisterial authority to preside over felony trials.77 The majority's reasoning
misapplied constitutional principles, Justice Scalia concluded.7 8
Although the majority "solved" any constitutional difficulties by assert-

ing that the district court ultimately controlled "the decision whether
and to what extent magistrates will be used,"7 9 Justice Scalia wrote, Article III demanded that "none of the Branches will itself alienate its assigned powers. ' ' s
The decision in Peretz represents the culmination of a long line of

cases offering conflicting interpretations of the Federal Magistrates Act
from the time of its inception. In 1968 Congress created the position of
United States Magistrate to replace United States Commissioners8 l and

to assist district judges with their judicial duties.8 2 Unlike the commis-

sioners, however, magistrates were required to be members of the bar, 3
and much like judges, received a salary, irreducible during a fixed, eightyear term.84 Although Congress remained free to cancel the salary protection" and thereby threaten intrabranch structural safeguards,1 6 the
appointment of magistrates by the district judges in the courts in which
they served alleviated some of the Article III concerns.8 7
The original version of the Federal Magistrates Act allowed magispowers, the Schor Court, emphasized the availability of de novo review. Schor, 478 U.S. at
853. The Peretz Court also upheld delegation of Article III powers, but the requisite provisions for "meaningful judicial review were nonexistent." Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2677 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
77. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In effect, once a power is assigned to a branch, the
branch must assume full responsibility for it. The intrabranch protections that concerned Justice Scalia assure impartiality in judicial decisionmaking and instill public confidence in the
judiciary. Downs, supra note 16, at 1036. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text for
a discussion of intrabranch structural protections.
81. Smith, supra note 1, at 143.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 143 n.2.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) (1988) (prohibiting salary reduction during a term in office); see
Bolanos, supra note 2, at 830 n. 11.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b).
86. Bolanos, supra note 2, at 830 n.11; see also Downs, supra note 16, at 1033 (noting that
the lack of protection for magistrates' tenure and salary fall short of the Article III protection
for district court judges).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988).

1344

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

trates to try minor criminal offenses."8 The Act also contained an "additional duties" clause whereby a majority of a district court's judges could

assign magistrates additional duties not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 9 In 1976 Congress amended the
Federal Magistrates Act9" in response to Wingo v. Wedding,9" a Supreme
Court decision that held that a magistrate could not conduct evidentiary

hearings on a petition for federal habeas corpus.92 Congress's 1976

amendment divided the Act into four parts. 93 The first part of the statute

provided that magistrates could hear and rule on nondispositive pretrial
matters; this part provided for judicial review when the magistrate's order was clearly erroneous as a matter of law.94 Magistrates also could
decide dispositive pretrial matters 95 subject to de novo review by a district court judge. 96 The second part allowed judges to appoint a special
master in civil cases. 9 7 The "additional duties" clause constituted the
third part.9 8 Finally, in the fourth part, Congress authorized magistrates
88. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107, 1116 (1968) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1988)). The legislative history indicates that Congress meant
specifically to confine magistrate jurisdiction to minor offenses and, in fact, excluded "certain
misdemeanors, which as a matter of sound congressional policy, ought to be tried in the U.S.
district courts." H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252,4265. For a treatment of the development of the Federal Magistrates Act,
see Peter G. McCabe, The FederalMagistratesAct of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 345-64
(1979).
89. 82 Stat. at 1116 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1988)); see, eg., United States
v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1432 n.10 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1034 (1988).
90. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 636 (1988)).
91. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
92. d at 472.
93. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1433.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). These pretrial matters excepted motions for injunctive relief; for judgment on the pleadings; for summary judgment; to dismiss or quash an indictment
or information made by the defendant; to suppress evidence in a criminal case; to dismiss or
permit maintenance of a class action; to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted; and to involuntarily dismiss an action. Id.
95. Id § 636(b)(1)(B).
96. Id § 636(b)(1).
97. Id § 636(b)(2). A "special master" is a referee, auditor, examiner, or assessor appointed by the court in which an action is pending. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a). A master may
perform all duties included in the order of reference from the judge, including regulating proceedings, requiring the production of evidence, and ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Id.
53(c).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Congress created this clause to encourage "innovative experimentations" in magistrate assignments to other matters and administrative functions. H.R.
REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172.
Congress contrasted the "business" matters assigned to magistrates with the "vital and adjudicatory" roles reserved for judges. Id. For example, Congress enumerated certain duties not
necessarily included in "the broad category of 'pretrial matters'" that judges may delegate to
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to conduct civil trials, but only with the express consent of the parties. 99
Various interpretations of these statutory provisions typified the
cases comprising the background of Peretz. In Mathews v. Weber 1oo the
Supreme Court decided that a magistrate could, as an additional duty,
conduct preliminary review, hear arguments, and prepare recommended
decisions in Social Security benefits cases."' Addressing concerns voiced
by representatives of the Justice Department when called as witnesses
that Congress might improperly "delegate to magistrates duties reserved
by the Constitution to Article III judges,"" °2 the Court stressed that matters referable to a magistrate were those in which delegation is "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 103 The
Court also emphasized that a magistrate could act only under a judge's
supervision and that the judge must retain authority to make final decisions. 1" In authorizing the delegation, the Court emphasized the administrative nature of the process, the ease of reviewing the record, and the
parties' participation. 10
Later, in United States v. Raddatz,10 6 the Court addressed the constitutionality of allowing a magistrate to conduct pretrial evidentiary
suppression hearings.10 7 The petitioner in Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Evidence at the suppression hearing revealed that when police arrived at the scene on August 8, 1976, they
observed Raddatz standing over the victim, Jimmy Baston, who was
bleeding from the head.108 After the officers arrested Raddatz for illegal
use of a weapon and gave him his Miranda warnings, Raddatz said that
he had been in a family dispute with Baston and that he had brought the
gun in case Baston's friends attempted to interfere. The state filed
magistrates; then, Congress declared that administrative duties may be delegated so that judges
will have time for their "traditional adjudicatory duties." Id.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
100. 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
101. Id. at 271-72.
102. Id at 269.
103. Id at 270.
104. Id.
105. See id at 271. The Court especially noted that the Article III judge maintained control of the process through the power of judicial review. Id at 270.
106. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
107. The magistrate's authority to conduct evidentiary suppression hearings stemmed from
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), which provides that a judge may designate a magistrate to conduct
evidentiary hearings. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 673. The Court also addressed whether the provisions for review satisfied Article III structural protections. Id at 677-80.
108. United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 667

(1980).
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charges against Raddatz. 10 9 Later, on November 19, 1976, agents from
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms questioned Raddatz at his
home regarding the gun used in the crime; the gun also had been used in
another crime. 110 Relating a different version of the events than the one
he gave on the day of the fight, Raddatz said that he had seized the gun
from Baston during the fight. He claimed to have no knowledge of the
gun's origins. On January 12, 1977, Raddatz requested another meeting
with the agents. There, he retracted his previous stories and claimed that
he obtained the gun from his half-brother."' At the suppression hearing,
Raddatz claimed that the agents induced him to incriminate himself with
promises of "cooperation" by law enforcement if he told them about the
gun.

112

The district court referred the hearing of the motion to suppress this
evidence to a magistrate.1 1 Finding that the respondent had made these
statements knowingly, the magistrate's report recommended denial of
the motion to suppress.' 14 After Raddatz filed objections to this report, a
district judge considered the transcript of the hearing before the magistrate, including "the parties' proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and supporting memoranda."1'15 After reading the magistrate's recommendation and hearing oral arguments of counsel, the judge denied
the motion to suppress.1 16 The court of appeals reversed the defendant's
conviction, holding that while the statute 17 allowing magistrates to conduct suppression hearings was constitutional, to satisfy due process
requirements, the judge personally must hear the testimony when credibility was crucial to the outcome.11
In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that de novo review constituted a de novo determination, not a
de novo hearing; nothing required a judge to rehear testimony himself. 1 19
Turning to the petitioner's constitutional objections, the Court held the
statute to be within the bounds of Article III because a judge maintained
109. Id. at 977.
110. Id.at 979.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988) (providing for de novo review).
118. Raddatz, 592 F.2d at 981.
119. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). In a de novo hearing, the judge
must rehear actual testimony himself. Id.
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control of the process and rendered the final decision.12 ' Moreover, the
statute satisfied due process requirements. 12 1 Although a suppression
hearing may determine the outcome of the trial-as many pretrial matters may-the Court recognized that the judge's role as the "ultimate
decisionmaker,"12' 2 along with his broad discretion to accept, reject, or
rehear personally the magistrate's findings, removed the danger of an erroneous determination by the magistrate. 123 The statute, the Court held,
thus permitted the judge to accept questions of credibility the magistrate
decided without hearing the witness.1 24
In 1989, the Court in Gomez v. United States 2 ' considered for the
first time the issue of jury selection by a magistrate in a felony trial. In
1 26
Gomez the defendants had been charged with distribution of cocaine.
They raised objections to magistrate-conducted voir dire 'when the district judge made the delegation and when trial commenced.1 27 The defendants were convicted. 28 On appeal, they contended that the
magistrate had no power to conduct voir dire and jury selection.1 2 9 The
Second Circuit affirmed and held that Congress intended the "additional
1 30
duties" clause to be construed broadly.
120. Id. at 681.
121. Because a motion to suppress requires the judge to hear the challenged testimony,
Raddatz contended that the Act violates due process by allowing the magistrate to hear testimony and the judge to decide whether to suppress that testimony. Id. at 677.
122. Id at 680.
123. Id. Anticipating many of his dissenting arguments in Peretz, Justice Marshall wrote
one of the dissents in Raddatz. Id at 694 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Justice Marshall contended that when the issue involved credibility and could not be determined by review of the
"cold record," due process required the judge himself to hear the testimony. Id (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall rested his argument on the foundation that "'the one who decides must hear."' Id at 696 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Morgan v. United States, 298
U.S. 468, 481 (1936)). Because there is a high risk of error in judicial determinations based on
the written record (especially when demeanor and impressions are important, as inissues of
credibility), the judge is bound to hear the testimony. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 680.
125. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
126. Id at 860.
127. Id. at 860-61.
128. Id at 861.
129. Id.
130. United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1329-30 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'dsub nom Gomez
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989). In Garciathe Second Circuit held that jury selection by
a magistrate was within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1988). Garcia,848 F.2d at 133233. The court noted that, even though jury selection was a trial rather than a pretrial matter,
the House Report contemplated experimentation beyond duties categorized as pretrial. Id. at
1329 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172). The defendant first maintained that delegation violated Article III.
Analyzing the constitutionality of the delegation, the court examined the structural guarantees
of Article III, § I (separation of powers). Id at 1330. The court concluded that because
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Framing the issue as "whether presiding at the selection of a jury in
a felony trial without the defendant's consent is among those 'additional
duties' [delegable to a magistrate],"'' the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 32 A unanimous Court held that "Congress did not intend the additional duties clause to embrace [the] function [of jury selection]."' 1 33 The
Court based its finding on statutory interpretation and legislative history, 134 - holding that duties performed under a general authorization
delegation occurred within one branch, the statute violated no structural protections. Id. at
1331. In its discussion of structural protections, the Second Circuit failed to consider Congress's ability to change magistrates' pay. Id. at 1330-32.
The second constitutional challenge was "'the right [of litigants] to have claims decided
before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.'" Id.
at 1332 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)). The Court held that the
point at which the trial begins and constitutional rights attach varies; each individual case and
the particular rights involved determine the variation. Id. Moreover, de novo review satisfies
the requirement that a member of the federal judiciary preside. Id The dissent argued that
the significance of voir dire on the outcome of the trial precluded a magistrate's authorization
to conduct jury selection. Id. at 1337 (Oakes, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Garcia, see
Recent Case, 102 HARv. L. REv. 533, 533-39 (1988).
131. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 860.
132. Gomez v. United States, 488 U.S. 1003 (1989); see also Gomez, 490 U.S. at 862 (detailing the Court's grant of certiorari). The Court granted certiorari in part to resolve a conflict
among the circuits. For instance, although some circuits agreed with Garcia,several circuits
had announced conflicting decisions. In United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that although jury selection constituted an integral part of the trial, id. at 1319, delegation
of voir dire did not conflict with Article III protections, as long as de novo review was available, id at 1318. Moreover, magistrate-conducted voir dire aided trial efficiency, id. at 131819.
In United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1034 (1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that jury selection
was not a duty Congress intended to delegate to magistrates. Id. at 1438. Because the defendant in Ford failed to object and because the trial was fair, however, the court aftrmed the
decision, id at 1439; but it noted that it did not imply thereby that consent would cure the
error, id at 1439 n.60. Supporting its reasoning, the court suggested that the 1968 legislative
struggle over petty offenses had no meaning if felonies were included. Id. at 1435. Congress
carefully excluded certain misdemeanors from the definition of "minor offenses" and devoted
considerable time to justifying the reasons behind allowing magistrates to try "minor offenses."
H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252,
4263-65; see infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. Similarly, the Raddatz Court's distinction between trial and pretrial would have been superfluous if the Court intended to include functions such as jury selection in the category of permissibly delegable pretrial matters.
Ford, 824 F.2d at 1435. For a discussion of Raddatz, see supra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
133. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875-76. The holding fails to mention the presence or absence of
consent. Id.
134. The Court's settled policy is to avoid statutory interpretation that implicates constitutional issues if a "reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question." Id.
at 864. The Court noted that the only mention of jury selection in the legislative history
occurs in one letter. Id at 875-76 n.30. The letter, from the Chief Judge of the District of
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should relate to enumerated duties.13 5 Because Congress carefully defined the grant of authority to magistrates in civil and minor criminal
cases, the Court concluded, Congress "implicitly withheld" this authority for felony trials. 1 6 The Court stressed Congress's emphasis on delegation of subsidiary matters so that judges could concentrate on trial. 37
Finally, the absence of a provision for review indicated that Congress did
not intend jury selection to be delegated; careful review provisions for
other "dispositive" pretrial matters supported the Gomez Court's conclusion. 138 The Court did not believe that Congress would include review
provisions for other pretrial matters, but would require no review for
jury selection-not even the less stringent clearly erroneous standard for
nondispositive pretrial matters.' 3 9 The Court also rejected petitioner's
harmless error argument, reasoning that error never could be harmless
when a court officer exceeded his jurisdiction."4
Conflicting circuit court decisions construing Gomez set the stage
for Peretz. In United States v. France 4 ' the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying Gomez retroactively, held that the
district judge could not delegate voir dire to a magistrate. 4 2 The defendant's failure to object did not change this decision for two reasons. First,
the court noted that the Gomez Court failed to base its holding on petitioner's objection. Moreover, prior to Gomez, the Ninth Circuit court
had established a "wall" of decisions allowing magistrate-conducted voir
dire, so that any objection would have been futile from the defendant's
143
standpoint.
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third CirOregon, suggested that magistrates select juries only in civil trials with the parties' consent.
135. Id. at 864.
136. Id. at 872.
137. Id at 872-73. Furthermore, jury selection, the Court wrote, constituted an integral
part of trial. Id at 873; see, eg., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892) (emphasizing the importance ofjury selection to trial); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 524 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1988), trial
in a jury case "commences" with voir dire).
138. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 874. The Court questioned whether any meaningful review of voir
dire could be achieved because of the subjectivity of the process: "[O]nly words can be preserved for review; no transcript can recapture the atmosphere of the voir dire which may
persist throughout the trial." Id at 874-75.
139. Id
140. Id at 876. The Court noted that a defendant has the right to "have all critical stages
of a criminal trial conducted by a person with jurisdiction to preside." Id
141. 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991).
142. Id at 228.
143. Id at 227-28.
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cuit, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams,1" held that a magistrate could conduct jury selection as long as the defendant did not
object."* In Williams the defendant neither consented nor objected to
magistrate-conducted voir dire.146 The court interpreted Gomez as allowing waiver of the right to have an Article III judge preside at voir
dire, even with implied consent." Thus, lower federal courts prior to
Peretz tended to interpret powers granted under the Federal Magistrate
Act broadly; the Supreme Court, however, had declined to extend powers much beyond those enumerated in the Act.
In contrast to these lower court decisions, Peretz expands magisterial powers. By focusing on the defendant's responsibility to object or
consent, 148 the Peretz Court retreated from the meticulous statutory
analysis149 and emphasis on Article III structural protections found in
previous cases. 150
Peretz cannot represent an extension of the Raddatz decision because fundamental differences separate the two cases. Because Raddatz
involved an express, amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act, 151 the
Court in that case did not expand the Act under the "additional duties"
clause.15 2 Likewise, a suppression hearing, which was the subject of the
Raddatz Court's decision, involves a defined pretrial motion under an
144. 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990).
145. Id. at 310-11.
146. Id at 306.
147. Id at 311. The Third Circuit also employed a balancing test, weighing the interests of
the criminal defendant against the underlying policies of the Federal Magistrates Act. Because
Congress intended the Act to relieve district judges of subordinate and ministerial duties, the
additional-duties clause, the court reasoned, provided an excellent forum for experimentation
in delegating duties to magistrates. Id. Although this policy must be balanced against a criminal defendant's right to the presence of an Article III judge, the Third Circuit held that deference to the defendant's choice achieved "the best of both possible worlds." Id. This balancing
test furthered the policy behind the Act and still protected the defendant's constitutional
rights. Id The court also interpreted a defendant's "indifference," or lack of objection to the
delegation, as consent. Id Defending its interpretation, the court emphasized that magistrateconducted voir dire would not injure the defendant, since magistrates are well-qualified to
select a jury. Id CompareClark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426, 1433-34 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
magistrate's power under the Act is a jurisdictional issue not subject to waiver) with United
States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir.) (holding subject matter jurisdiction not involved in
jury selection, so that right is subject to waiver), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990) and
United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542, 1549 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant's
failure to object to magistrate-conducted voir dire resulted in waiver of his right to have an
Article III judge preside over jury impanelment).
148. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2668-69.
149. See, eg., Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989).
150. See, eg., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 678 (1980).
151. Id. at 674; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1988).
152. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-83.

1992]

LEGISLATIVE COURTS

1351

express statutory provision."l 3 Conversely, the role of jury selection in a
trial, the subject of the Peretz decision, far from being a dispositive pretrial motion covered under the Act, generally is considered part of the
trial itself.154 Finally, the Raddatz Court resolved Article III separationof-powers problems by relying on the statutory provision for de novo
This standard of review assured that the Article III judge
review.'
made the final determination and that structural safeguards remained intact.1 56 The Peretz Court, however, confronted the case's structural Article III difficulties by noting that judicial review is not banned-the
defendant presumably may obtain review if she objects."5 7 Unfortunately, this argument is weak because the Court did not cure Congress's
failure to mention a review standard by "finding inherent power to review by a constitutionally adequate standard."'' 5 This tactic fails to address congressional intent behind the absence of a review standard.'5 9

The Peretz Court also departed significantly from its unanimous ruling in Gomez. Even though the Gomez Court framed the issue for con-

sideration as the determination of permissible magistrate conduct
"without the defendant's consent,"'" the consent issue received sparse
treatment throughout the remainder of the Gomez opinion.' 6' In fact,
the Gomez Court's actual holding noticeably lacked the slightest mention
of consent.' 62 In Peretz, however, the Court dwelt on the importance of
the defendant's consent throughout its entire opinion.' 63 In Gomez the
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
154. E.g., United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1034 (1988).
155. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-82; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
156. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-82.
157. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2670-71.
158. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1437.
159. Id The absence of adequate judicial review implies that Congress did not intend the
delegation of voir dire. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even if the district
judge applied de novo review rather than a lesser standard, the possibility of meaningful judicial review remains doubtful. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting). Absence of adequate or meaningful judicial review means that the Article III judge may not control the final decision, so that
structural protections are threatened. Id at 2677 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 860 (1989).
161. Id at 863-76; see also United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 227 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding defendant's consent not the basis of the Gomez decision), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991).
162. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875-76.
163. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2663-71. Consent is important to the Article III "personal right"
to an independent and impartial adjudicator because this Article III provision, unlike structural protections, is waivable. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
849 (1986); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing Article III protections).
Because the defendant in Gomez objected to delegation of voir dire to the magistrate, the issue
of waiver of Article III personal rights was not present. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 860.
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Court, following its settled policy, interpreted the statute to avoid a constitutional conflict. 1' 4 On the one hand, the Gomez Court carefully inspected the legislative history of the statute to determine that Congress

did not intend such an expansion of magistrates' powers, thereby avoiding unnecessary constitutional interpretation.' 6 5 The Peretz Court, on
the other hand, virtually invited constitutional debate by interpreting the

statute to prompt such debate; 66 it also largely ignored and circumvented the legislative history on the subject, 6 7 with the exception of one
letter. 6 ' Therefore, Peretz represents not only an expansion of magistrates' duties beyond those contemplated by previous cases, but also a

style of engendering constitutional debate69in statutory analysis rather

than avoiding constitutional adjudication.1
The analysis of the Peretz majority also presents questionable logic
and numerous inconsistencies. In its statutory interpretation, the majority, as Justice Marshall noted in dissent, failed to consider the illogic of
170
Congress creating a separate section under the Act for misdemeanors,
17 1
yet wholly excluding any reference to participation in felony trials.
Title 18 of the United States Code sets out magistrates' specific criminal
trial jurisdiction. 172 Although this section deals extensively and specifi164. See Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864.
165. See ia at 865-74.
166. See Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669.
167. The majority ignored the congressional debate over the 1968 amendments regarding
which "minor offenses" magistrates could try. The Peretz Court failed to mention that Congress drew a line beyond which certain misdemeanors should be tried not by magistrates, but
by district judges, as a matter of "sound congressional policy." H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4252, 4265. The Court also ignored
Congress's characterization of the purpose of magistrates-to aid the business of the courts in
order to give judges more time for "their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties." H.R. REP.
No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172.
168. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2668 n.11. This letter was noted briefly in Gome'. Gomez, 490
U.S. at 875 n.30 (citing H.R. RP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprintedin 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6169). The letter, from the Chief Judge of the District of Oregon, suggested that magistrates could conduct voir dire, probably only with the consent of the parties
and in civil cases. Id The letter also displayed a callous attitude toward the validity of assignment of jury selection and methods of implementation and review of the jury selection. Id.
(citing Hearingon S. 1283 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1975)).
169. The Court in Gomez, for example, stressed the policy that the Supreme Court should
interpret a federal statute to avoid constitutional issues "if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question." Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864. Instead of deciding that felony voir dire was a nondelegable duty, thereby avoiding Article III structural difficulties, the
Peretz Court rejected the Gomez Court's interpretation and invited constitutional debate. See
Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669-7 1.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1988).
171. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2672 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3402 (1988).
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cally with misdemeanors that magistrates may handle at trial, Congress
did not authorize any magisterial authority in felony trials.' 73 This result
proves especially puzzling if one considers that most commentators consider felony trials to commence with jury selection. 74 Moreover, Congress expressly reserved some misdemeanors' 7 5 for Article III judges to
adjudicate because such crimes were left more properly to judges with
life tenure and guaranteed salary.' 7 6 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed in United States v. Ford,'7 7 the careful debate and delineation of which misdemeanor and civil matters could
be referred to magistrates would be surplusage if Congress intended to

grant a broad general power-such as would include all felony trials, not
to mention misdemeanors and civil matters-under the "additional du-

ties" clause. 7
The Court also paid scant attention to the purpose behind the Federal Magistrates Act: to help Article III judges with routine and pretrial
duties so that the judges could perform their vital adjudicatory functions. 179 Although it observed that jury selection may affect the outcome
of the trial in the same way as other pretrial matters, 8 0 the Peretz Court
did not lend due credence to the vital adjudicatory role that jury selection plays in felony trials.' 8 ' Even if voir dire were classified as pretrial,

jury selection more pervasively affects the entire trial process than, for
173. See id § 3401.
174. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2672-73 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Jury selection is "an organic part of the trial process." J. C. Loy, United States v. Ford. United States Magistrates
Not Empowered to Preside Over Jury Selection in Felony Cases, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1485, 1489
(1988). Thejudge's presence impresses the jury with the seriousness of the proceedings; attorneys also educate the judge about the case during voir dire. Id Moreover, because the accused has constitutional rights (such as the right to a speedy trial, to confront witnesses, to
counsel, and to public proceedings) during jury selection, voir dire logically is part of the trial
itself. Id at 1487; see also Recent Case, supra note 130, at 539 (noting that because voir dire
plays the critical role of assuring an impartial jury, jury selection deserves the ultimate protection of an Article III judge).
175. For examples of misdemeanors reserved for trial by judges, see 18 U.S.C. § 210 (1988)
(offering to procure appointive public office); idL § 242 (depriving of rights under color of law);
id § 1304 (broadcasting lottery information); id § 2234 (exceeding authority in executing
warrant).
176. H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4252, 4264-65.
177. 824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert denied,484 U.S. 1034 (1988). See supra
note 132 for a discussion of Ford.
178. Ford, 824 F.2d at 1434-35.
179. H.R. RP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6162, 6172.
180. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669.
181. Id. at 2672 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text
for a discussion of felony jury selection as a part of the trial itself.
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example, a suppression hearing."8 2 Logically, then, Congress would have
included a "pretrial" procedure such as felony jury selection with the
other dispositive pretrial motions in the Act'8 3 rather than relegating
voir dire, which can affect the entire trial more so than the dispositive
motions enumerated in the Act, to the "additional duties" clause. These
considerations point to jury selection as an adjudicatory function 14in a
1
felony trial. The Peretz majority glossed over this entire question.
Another illogical part of the majority's opinion regarding statutory
interpretation stems from Congress's careful delineation of the express
consent provisions for misdemeanor"8 ' and civil trials in the Federal
Magistrates Act." 6 Both parties in a civil trial must consent before the
magistrate can hear the case. 7 Even misdemeanor consent requires a
writing."8 As the dissent contended, it would be irrational for Congress,
if it had intended to include felony jury selection as a delegable duty, to
emphasize consent in these instances, but provide no guidelines for felony
trial voir dire.'8 9 The majority also made much of the comparable quality of misdemeanor trial supervision and felony jury selection; however,
the comparability is clear only to the majority."' If the duties were so
comparable, it follows that jury selection would have been included in
1 91
the list of delegable duties under section 636(b)(1)(B).
Likewise, Congress, in its 1976 amendments to the Act, meticulously distinguished between dispositive and nondispositive pretrial mat182. See generally United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 872-74 (lst Cir. 1983) (examining both suppression hearing and jury selection criteria). The jury sits through the entire
trial; it constitutes the heart of the trial-determining guilt or innocence. A suppression hearing, in contrast, simply determines whether evidence is admissible. Id
183. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1988).
184. See Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2670-71.
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1988).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). The delineation of guidelines for consent ensures that consensual reference of voir dire to a magistrate is voluntary. Platt, supra note 2, at 483-86.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). After the clerk of court locates an available magistrate, the
judge or magistrate must again inform the parties that they are free to withhold their consent.
Id § 636(c)(2).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b).
189. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2667. Although the majority concluded that supervising civil and misdemeanor
trials is comparable to presiding over jury selection in a felony trial, the court neither alluded
to any of the comparable qualities nor supported its statement in any way. Id. Conviction of
misdemeanors triable by magistrates may result in imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b), and
felony convictions may be enforced with significant periods of incarceration. See, e.g., Gomez
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 861 (1989). Civil trials, of course, do not involve the threat of
imprisonment.
191. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) details
the dispositive pretrial motions delegable to magistrates.
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ters, and provided for methods ofjudicial review in both cases: a de novo
standard for the former and a clearly erroneous standard for the latter. 192
For nondispositive pretrial motions, the judge can reconsider the magistrate's rulings when the magistrate's order is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 193 In the case of hearings, applications for post-trial relief,
and dispositive pretrial motions-such as motions for injumctive relief,
for summary judgment, and for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted-the judge must make a de novo determination of any findings to which objection is made.' 94 The Peretz Court
made much of the fact that no statutory provisions bar review, and therefore that the defendant presumably could have obtained review if he had
objected. 195 Such reasoning, however, neatly evades logic: why, if Congress spent so much time in promulgating these rules, did it mention
neither jury selection nor a standard of review? Such a question is particof the special difficulties jury selection presents
ularly pertinent in light
196
for de novo review.
The Peretz Court's failure to address the question of review permitted it to dodge the issue of whether delegating felony voir dire to a magistrate violated the structural protections of Article 111197 and instead to
base its constitutional discussion on waiver of the personal right to an
impartial Article III adjudicator. 198 This reasoning is circular: because
consent alleviates Article III's protection of personal rights, the Peretz
Court reasoned, Article III's nonwaivable structural protections are not
implicated and the question of adequate review merits little consideration. Moreover, the reasoning rests on an unproven presumption that
consent cures all defects. 19 9 The independent judiciary, under Article
III, section 1, provides the following protections: (1) individual rights;
(2) structure of the government, or separation of powers; (3) intrabranch protections; (4) the judiciary's role in regulating the federal
government's relationship with the states; and (5) the judiciary itself.2'
An independent judiciary protects individuals' rights because only judges
192. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).
193. il § 636(b)(I)(A).
194. Id. § 636(b)(1).
195. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2670-71.
196. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874-75 (1989); Recent Case, supra note
130, at 538. Meaningful review of a magistrate's decisions at voir dire is almost impossible
because "a judge must be physically present to detect juror bias." Id Requestioning not only
makes jurors defensive, but also reduces the efficiency of the magistrates. Id.
197. See Peretz, I11 S.Ct. at 2669.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Downs, supra note 16, at 1035-37.
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"insulated from the formal political process can preserve those rights
against popular causes" and guarantee citizens their constitutional
rights.2 0 1 Through tenure and salary requirements, the structural protections insulate judges from domination by other branches.2 "2 Intrabranch
protections assure impartiality in judicial decisionmaking despite disapproval by judicial colleagues. Article III's protection of judicial independence also prevents presidential or congressional intrusions on state
sovereignty "under the guise of judicial decision. ' 20 3 Finally, an independent judiciary affords protection to the judiciary itself by instilling
public confidence in, and attracting qualified people to, the judiciary." 4
In light of all of these protections, the argument that the right to an
Article III judge can be waived is based on an "incomplete interpretation
of Article III. ' ' 20 For example, a litigant rests her consent on her interpretation of her personal rights; she has no interest in the structural protections, such as separation of powers, enumerated above.20 6 Moreover,
review provisions fail to solve the problem because "reduced judicial impartiality will seldom result in measurable injury to the litigant. '2 0 7 Article III structural protections thus shield the litigant from virtually
undetectable injury occurring throughout the trial, as well as blatant injury.20 8 Consent also does not protect later litigants' interests affected by
binding decisions rendered by a magistrate.20 9
The Court's constitutional analysis therefore exhibits marked inconsistencies. In addressing the defendant's Article III structural argument,
the majority contended that the possibility of de novo review cures any
problems.21 0 The Court, however, failed to consider the theory that Article III problems can arise intrabranch.21 1 Because there is a great danger
that a judge could not conduct meaningftil review of jury selection,2 12 the
likelihood of magistrates usurping judicial authority intrabranch seems
201. I at 1036.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1037. The states evidenced great mistrust of federal power during the time
Article III was drafted. Id
204. Id
205. Id. at 1059.
206. Id
207. Id
208. Id
209. Id
210. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2671. In Raddatz Justice Marshall had considered the possibility
that any comparable law not providing expressly for judicial review might be unconstitutional
in itself. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 711-12 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In other words, one branch should
not alienate its own assigned powers. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

1992]

LEGISLATIVE COURTS

1357

great. As Justice Marshall pointed out, the Article III judge may effectively lose control by not rendering the final decision.2 13
The Peretz Court's constitutional analysis and treatment of consent
dismantled the notions of consent, waiver, and Article III structural protections articulated earlier in Commodity Futures TradingCommission v.
Schor.2 14 The Schor Court expressed a rigid test for'consent in delegating
Article III powers to non-Article III tribunals: if Article III structural
principles are implicated, the parties cannot "cure the constitutional difficulty" by consent.21 The factors the Court considered in deciding
whether a delegation to a non-Article III tribunal threatened the "institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch"2 6 were "the extent to which
the 'essential attributes of... judicial power' are reserved to Article III
courts[,] ... the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts, the... importance of the right to be adjudicated," and the reasons behind Congress's departure from Article III requirements.21 7 In
contrast, the Peretz Court, essentially ignoring these factors, held that
Article III structural protections were not implicated because review by
the district judge was available.21 ' Whereas the Schor Court determined
that consent could not waive Article III structural protections, and developed a test to determine whether these institutional safeguards were
threatened,2 1 9 the Peretz Court portrayed consent as a "cure-all." 2 ° The
only "test" the Peretz majority used to examine whether magistrate-conducted felony voir dire violated structural protections was whether judicial review was available.2 21 Expanding the significance of consent and
diminishing the importance of Article III protections, the Peretz Court
departed significantly from Schor and left the future of that opinion in
question.
Finally, the Peretz Court never addressed the fact that, after
Wingo, 222 Congress quickly amended the Act22 3 because the Court disallowed a function Congress had intended magistrates to perform; how213. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). In Schor the Court determined whether the Commodity Ex-

change Act's grant to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission of the power to entertain
state law counterclaims in reparations proceedings violated Article III. Id at 835-36.
215. Id at 850-51.
216. Id at 851.
217. Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
218. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669-71.
219. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850-52.
220. Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669.
221. Id at 2669-71.
222. For a discussion of Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), see supra note 3.
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ever, Congress made no such move after Gomez when the Supreme Court
failed to delegate jury selection. The logical inference is that Congress,
satisfied that the Court had interpreted correctly congressional intent,

felt no need to make revisions or clarifications.
Despite Justice Marshall's insight into the impetus behind the Fed-

eral Magistrates Act,224 several flaws pervaded his argument as well.
First, in discussing the legislative history of the Federal Magistrates Act,
Justice Marshall did not address congressional encouragement of innovative experimentation.2 2 Moreover, as recognized by Justice Marshall,
one letter submitted during the legislative hearings did mention magistrates presiding over jury trials; yet the letter also referred to "perhaps
only... 6civil trials" and betrayed the writer's callousness as to form of
review.

22

Another haunting question that Justice Marshall never answered involves the framing of the issue in Gomez: he never addressed why the
Gomez Court phrased the question so narrowly. 22 7 The majority in Peretz merely had to step through the hole created by this narrow approach;

although they may have widened it, it was the Gomez Court that made
the opening.
Because Justice Scalia analyzed the jurisdictional posture of the
claim at length, 228 he paid little heed to the actual issues, other than to
agree with Justice Marshall. His observation, however, that Article III
structural protections implicate intrabranch usurpation is compelling.2 29
For instance, magistrates' positions are not public appointments but

rather are merit-based; 23 0 thus, allowing magistrate-supervised felony
223. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729-30 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) (1988)).
224. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of the Act.
225. See H.R. RP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172.
226. See Peretz, I 11 S. Ct. at 2674 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gomez v. United States, 490
U.S. 858, 875 n.30 (1989). See supra note 168 for a discussion of this letter in the legislative
history.
227. See Gomez, 490 U.S. at 859-60. The issue in Gomez was "whether presiding at the
selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent is among those 'additional
duties' [of a magistrate]." Id.
228. See Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia determined that
the question of improper delegation did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 2678
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, although Peretz had forfeited his right to advance challenges to
the magistrate, the Court had discretion to "overlook" the trial forfeiture. Noting that this
claim involved forfeiture by definition (because if Peretz had objected, the magistrate would
not have been assigned), Justice Scalia determined that the Court properly exercised its discretion to hear the case. I at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. Smith, supra note 1, at 144.
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voir dire places too much power in the judges who appoint magistrates.
Therefore, because Article III's structural component protects the judiciary intrabranch in part to assure unbiased judicial decision making despite pressure from judicial colleagues, delegation of felony voir dire
offends Article III. By placing district judges in a position to influence
the outcome of voir dire over which the judge herself does not preside,
magistrate-conducted felony jury selection distorts intrabranch
protections.
Peretz implicates a variety of significant policy questions. An obvious result will be lighter caseloads for federal judges.23 1 In 1986 magistrates handled 445,575 matters for the federal courts, 2 32 and courts
increasingly have delegated judicial tasks to magistrates since that
time.2 33 Before Peretz circuit courts interpreting Gomez already were
delegating felony jury selection to magistrates.2 3 4 The Peretz decision
only can increase that trend which poses grave Article III questions and
possibly allows non-Article III judges increasingly to assume inherently
judicial roles.
Proliferation of this trend, however, may leave the legal system to
face the development of a two-tiered federal judiciary.235 Poorer citizens
who cannot afford to wait for a judge may consent to a magistrate presiding at jury selection. 236 Dismantling the entire Article III system
through consensual reference creates a further danger behind the Federal
Magistrates Act.2 37 Included in the dangers of such a development is the
possibility that magistrates are less capable overall than judges. 2 38 Moreover, continued efforts to utilize fully the magistrate system may eradicate any notion of true consent because of constant official "channeling"
into the system to lighten the caseload.2 39
Although the Court did not address due process concerns, the Peretz
231. This result conforms with the purpose of the Act. See supra notes 3-6 for a discussion

of the history of the Federal Magistrates Act.
232. Smith, supra note 1, at 143; see also Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and
Allocation of Work in FederalTrial Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909, 911-12 (1990) (estimating the
number of judicial proceedings over which magistrates presided in 1987 to be 500,000).
233. See Bolanos, supra note 2, at 827.
234. See, eg., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied,474 U.S. 847 (1985). Actually, however, felony case filings represent a fairly
small portion of the district court caseload, so the time savings in delegating jury selection in
felony trials to magistrates is not terribly significant. Loy, supra note 174, at 1490.
235. Bolanos, supra note 2, at 837 n.38.
236. IdL
237. Wagner, supra note 16, at 581.
238. Bolanos, supra note 2, at 837 n.38.
239. Id. at 838. Other problems with consensual reference include the possibility of judi-
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decision may affect a defendant's due process rights. The three factors
the Court has considered determinative of due process were: (1) the private interests implicated, (2) the risk of an erroneous determination by
reason of the process accorded and the probable value of added procedural safeguards, and (3) public interest and administrative burdens.2'
The administrative burden falls by allowing a magistrate to conduct voir
dire; however, constant appeals from magistrates' decisions might lessen
these savings. Public interest may favor judges retaining control of voir
dire: avoiding a two-tiered system is a prime benefit. Finally, the risk of
an erroneous determination in magistrate-conducted voir dire is fairly
high, especially in light of the aforementioned difficulties with judicial
review.24 1 The private interests are high because jury selection is often
outcome determinative.242 Hence, Peretz may restrict a litigant's right to
243
due process.
Finally, Peretz may offend the judicial system's fundamental fairness. Under this analysis, magistrate jury selection in felony trials undermines the system. 2 " For example, if increasing numbers of litigants
choose non-Article III magistrates to determine their cases, the system's
"reliability and integrity" could be threatened by "non-article III judicial
officers delivering unreliable judgments."245 The main argument supporting this position is that magistrates can enter judgment in federal
misdemeanor trials but not in felony trials because this practice would
undermine fundamental fairness.24 6 Fundamental fairness in trials ensures the integrity of judgments, and hence the reliability of the syscial coercion through routine referral of judicial duties to magistrates and pressure on the
litigants to consent. Kraakman, supra note 2, at 1050-51.
240. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980).
241. Peretz, 111 S.Ct. at 2673 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text for discussion of problems with judicial review.
242. United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 111 S.Ct. 805 (1991).
243. See Maria Eisland, Note, The FederalMagistrates Act: Are Defendants' Rights Violated When Magistrates PresideOver Jury Selection In Felony Cases?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
783, 793-96 (1988). According to Eisland, due process requires application of the balancing
test if the defendant does not consent. Id. at 794.
244. Bolanos, supra note 2, at 855. This analysis, however, presupposes that magistrates
are less competent than judges. Id.
245. Id.at 854-55. Thus, simply because the litigants retained their personal right to Article III adjudication through the consent requirement, the system itself remains vulnerable. Id.
246. IL; see Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functionsof CriminalProcedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 202 (1983). One of the most
important aspects of the judicial process is how it appears to the community. The system must
maintain community respect for fairness of processes and reliability; continued delegation of
judiciary functions to magistrates may undermine the perception of Article III judges' reliability. Id.
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tern. 24 7 Thus, magistrate jury selection, as part of a felony trial, likewise
should not be allowed.
The consequences of Peretz may not be immediately deleterious;
however, erosions in constitutional guarantees, although slight at first,
may become larger. Peretz, for example, may be expanded to include
implied, rather than simply express, consent. In fact, the majority's
holding leaves room for just such an interpretation.2 4 Therefore, Peretz
significantly expands the magistrate's power under the Federal Magistrates Act. The majority accomplished this expansion by ignoring controlling Supreme Court precedent and legislative history. The Court
manipulated Article III doctrine by evading structural protection arguments. It also misconstrued and overemphasized the Gomez Court's discussion of consent. Peretz thus marks the beginning of an expansion of
magistrate authority, often at the expense of litigants' rights and constitutional protections, and without regard to whether consent to this authority is express or implied.
KIMBERLY ANNE HUFFMAN

247. Bolanos, supra note 2, at 854.

248. See Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2671. The Court held that "permitting a magistrate to conduct the voir dire in a felony trial when the defendant raises no objection is entirely faithful to
the congressional purpose in enacting and amending the Federal Magistrates Act." Id (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court did not limit its holding to the situation in which the defendant
expressly consents, as did the defendant in Peretz. Id. at 2663. The language in the holding
thus suggests that implied consent also may waive the right to an Article III judge. See id at
2671.

